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Abstract. From the seminal paper by Singh [22], commitment protocols
have been raising a lot of attention. The key feature of commitment
protocols is their declarative nature, which allows specifying them in a
way which abstracts away from any reference to the actual behavior of
the agents. By doing so, commitment protocols respect the autonomy of
agents. After more than ten years from the introduction of commitments,
it is time to ask (i) if a “commitment to do something” is the only kind
of regulative norm, that we need in order to give a social semantics to
a physical action, and (ii) if they realize what they promised. In this
position paper we discuss these points.
1 Introduction
Practical commitments lie at the level of regulative (or preservative) norms that,
in turn, impact on the agents’ behavior, creating social expectations, that should
not be frustrated. By a practical commitment, in fact, an actor (debtor) is com-
mitted towards another actor (creditor) to bring about something [9, 20], i.e. to
act either directly or by persuading others so as to make a condition of interest
become true. Due to their social nature, practical commitments are a powerful
tool that helps to overcome the controversial assumptions of the mentalistic ap-
proach that mental states are verifiable and that agents are sincere. Moreover,
they support an observational semantics for communication that allows verifying
an agent’s compliance with its commitments based on observable behavior.
From the seminal paper by Singh [22], commitment protocols have been rais-
ing a lot of attention, see for instance [27, 17, 25, 12, 24, 14, 6]. The key feature of
commitment protocols is their declarative nature, which allows specifying them
in a way which abstracts away from any reference to the actual behavior of the
agents, thus avoiding to impose useless execution constraints [28]. By doing so,
commitment-based protocols respect the autonomy of agents because whatever
action they decide to perform is fine as long as they accomplished their com-
mitments, satisfying each others’ expectations. Now, after more than ten years
from the introduction of commitments, it is time to ask (i) if a “commitment
to do something” is the only kind of regulative norm, that we need in order to
give a social semantics to a physical action, and (ii) if they realize what they
Fig. 1. The four considered intertwined aspects.
promised. To this aim, we think that there are four intertwined aspects to be
considered (see Figure 1):
1. Agent Coordination: how to account for coordination patterns?
2. Infrastructure for Execution: which is the reference execution infrastructure?
3. Observability of Events: are events really observable by all agents?
4. Composition of Coordination Patterns: is composition influenced by the pre-
vious aspects?
2 Agent Coordination
Commitment protocols leave the choice of which action to execute and when,
totally up to the single agents. From a more general perspective, they do not
impose constraints on the possible evolutions of the social state. However, in
many practical cases there is the need to capture regulative aspects of agent
coordination. For instance, a customer and a merchant may agree that payment
should be done before shipping but how to represent this socially agreed con-
straint in commitment protocols? When a similar coordination is desired by the
parties, one feels the lack of the means for capturing them as regulations inside
the protocol. Notice that the desired coordination patterns, though restricting
the choices up to the agents, would not prevent flexibility because, for instance,
it is not mandatory that payment and shipping are one next to the other. What
matters is their relative order. More importantly, an agreed coordination pat-
tern establishes the boundaries within which each party can exercise his/her own
autonomy without compromising the aims for which the agreement was taken.
Citing Dwight Eisenhower (State of the Union Address, Feb. 2, 1953) “To be
true to one’s own freedom is, in essence, to honor and respect the freedom of all
others.” As long as agents respect such constraints, they are free to customize
the execution at their will, e.g. by interleaving the two actions with others (like
sending a receipt or asking a quote for another item). This need is felt by the
research community, see [4–6] for an overview.
When regulations are expressed, agents can individually check whether their
behavior conforms to the specification [2]. But in order to guarantee to the oth-
ers that one will act in a way that conforms to the regulation, an agent should
formally bind its behavior to the regulation itself. The proposal in [3, 6], for
instance, allows the representation of temporal regulations imposed on the evo-
lution of the social state, however, it does not supply a deontic semantics to the
constraints. Therefore the agents’ behavior is not formally bound to them. On
the other hand, the Regula framework [19] uses precedence logic to express
temporal patterns that can be used as antecedent (or consequent) conditions
inside commitments. Since patterns may involve various parties, the framework
also introduces a notion of condition control and of commitment safety, in order
to allow agents to reason about the advisability of taking a commitment. How-
ever, patterns are not generally expressed on the evolution of the social state
but are limited to events.
3 Infrastructure for Execution and Observability of
Events
Commitments were introduced to support run-time verification in contrast to
the mentalistic approach but despite this, they still lack of a reference infras-
tructure that practically enables such a verification. Verification is supported
by proposals like [1, 10], although the authors do not draft an infrastructure,
while commitment machines [28, 25, 23] have mainly been used to provide an
operational semantics. Normative approaches, e.g. institutions [16, 17], provide
an answer but with some limitations. Indeed, they tend to implicitly assume a
centralized vision, often realized by introducing a new actor, whose task is to
monitor the interaction: the institution itself. This assumption is coherent with
the fact that commitment protocols tend to assume that events are uniformly
observed by all the agents although in the real world this seldom happens; for
instance, communications tend to be point-to-point. For instance, consider an e-
commerce seller, a supplier, and a client: the seller communicates with both the
supplier and the client, who do not interact with one another. In other words,
the interaction between each pair of actors is point-to-point and cannot be ob-
served by the third party. We need the infrastructure to support this kind of
interaction and to monitor, in this context, the on-going enactment, checking
whether it respects all the regulative aspects – that the designer identified as
relevant or that the agents agreed.
Chopra and Singh [11] addressed the issue of realizing an architecture that
relaxes the centralization constraint by incorporating the notion of commitment
alignment. In this way it becomes possible to answer questions like “how to decide
whether agents are acting in a way that complies to the regulations or not?”,
“How to know that an agent satisfied one of its commitments?” in contexts where
events are not uniformly observable. Nevertheless, they relegated commitment
alignment to the middleware, shielding the issue of observability of events from
the agents and from the designer. Our claim is that this is a limitation and that
in many real-world situations it is more desirable to have the means of making
clear who can access what information and who is accountable for reporting
what event. This is especially true when the protocol allows the representation
of coordination patterns: there is the need of mechanisms for expressing who
can observe what, tracking which part of a pattern was already followed, which
is left to be performed, who is in charge of the next moves, and so on. As a
consequence, we think that the specification of the coordination patterns and
the design of the infrastructure cannot leave out the observability of events,
which plays a fundamental role at the level of the protocol specification and, for
this reason, it should be captured by first-class abstractions and appropriate
regulations. Such abstractions/regulations should be represented in a way that
makes them directly manipulable by the agents [7].
4 Composition of Coordination Patterns
Most of the works concerning software engineering aspects of commitment proto-
col specification focus on the formal verification to help the protocol designer to
get rid of or to enforce given behaviors, [26, 18, 8, 15, 14]. An aspect that is not to
be underestimated is the realization of a development methodology for commit-
ment protocols. The most relevant representative is the Amoeba methodology
[13], which allows the design of commitment protocols and their composition into
complex business processes. With respect to the aspects that we are discussing,
this methodology, however, has two main limits. On the one hand, when two or
more protocols are composed, the designer is requested to define a set of tempo-
ral constraints among events and of data flow constraints to combine the various
parts. However, such constraints have neither a regulatory flavor nor a deontic
characterization. On the other hand, since a wider number of roles are involved,
which among actors of one protocol is entitled to (and physically can) observe
events generated inside another protocol? The methodology does not explicitly
account for this problem in the description of the various steps that compose
it. For instance, suppose of composing a protocol that allows a merchant and a
supplier to interact with one that allows the same merchant to interact with a
customer. It is unrealistic to suppose that the client can observe events involving
the supplier, even though after the composition both actors will play in the same
protocol. Actually, it would be useful to incorporate in the protocol the means
for letting the merchant tell the client that it received items from the supplier
in a way that makes it accountable for its declarations.
5 Conclusive remarks
Commitments [21] are a powerful tool for creating communication and interac-
tion standards with a solid and verifiable semantics, which is extremely impor-
tant for dealing with open worlds, but to this aim there is the need of solving
the issues that we have discussed.
1. Agent Coordination: how to account for coordination patterns? We claim
that for accounting for coordination patterns there is the need of enriching
the language for expressing commitment conditions (both antecedents and
consequents) with temporal expressions in a way that shapes the desired
interactions.
2. Infrastructure for Execution: which is the reference execution infrastructure?
In our opinion, there is the need of reifying interaction protocols as first-class
elements that can be manipulated and inspected by agents, rather than
relegating them to the middleware.
3. Observability of Events: are events really observable by all agents? In the
real world events are not uniformly observable by all the interacting parties.
The seller-shipper-client example shows this fact in practice and proves that
inside commitment protocols there is the need of specifying and managing
objects like claims, assertions, declarations, statements, so typical in every
day life as well as in programming languages. Indeed, by stating something
about a state of things that the client cannot observe directly, the seller
took a commitment, though not a practical one. A crucial limitation of the
interaction protocols literature is that here the used commitments are always
practical, meaning that they describe what the roles involved would bring
about (e.g. a buyer commits to paying for some item). Practical commitments
are limited to the debtor’s own capabilities and powers (including persuading
others), however, real scenarios often require the account of some event,
without delegating the burden of making it happen to the agent who gives
the account.
4. Composition of Coordination Patterns: is composition influenced by the pre-
vious aspects? All the above aspects should be supported by appropriate
software engineering methodologies. This will have a positive impact on the
acceptance of declarative approaches inside industrial settings.
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